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Farah argues that cognitive neuropsychology assumes a modular
cognitive architecture, in Fodor's (1983) sense, and that this
leads naturally to the "locality assumption." She recommends an
alternative class of computational models, interactive connec-
tionist networks, which violate locality. Although the specific
interactive connectionist models she discusses are interesting
alternatives to existing box-and-arrow accounts in their respec-
tive domains, the general arguments they are intended to
illustrate are less compelling.
First, violations of locality are common in modular as well as
interactive systems. Consider the muscular system, which has a
clearly defined modular structure. Damage to one component
(for example, straining a particular leg muscle) may cause
significant compensatory changes in the behaviour of others
(causing a completely different gait, or even a different method
of locomotion - e.g., hopping rather than walking). Thus, the
behaviour of a component, even in a modular system, may very
well change immediately if another component of that system is
damaged. In psychological terms, one would say that damage
may cause patients to change their strategy for carrying out a
particular task. For example, a subject who has lost the putative
lexical reading route might start to rely on phonological or
semantic routes which were not involved in premorbid reading.
Nonetheless, whereas what we might term "behavioural lo-
cality" may be violated in such situations, locality of function
need not be. The functional capabilities of the individual mus-
cles (i.e., the forces they can generate) will presumably be
unchanged immediately after damage elsewhere in the muscu-
lar system. However, these functional capabilities will them-
selves rapidly alter as the system becomes adapted to the new
mode of function. Just as muscles adjust rapidly to their new
role, so components of a modular cognitive system may rapidly
learn to adapt to their new cognitive function. Violations of
locality, either behavioural or functional, will make it very
complex to draw inferences about normal function from im-
paired performance.
Second, the modularity thesis (Fodor 1983) is not addressed
by Farahs models, despite being the subject of the introductory
discussion. Fodor's contention, which Farah opposes, is that the
cognitive processes involved in perceptual analysis, motor con-
trol, and language processing are organized into modules which
are informationally isolated from one another and from the
unencapsulated central processes which mediate common sense
thought. The precise grain of such modules is not specified, but
Fodor's principal concern is to defend the view that large
cognitive domains (e.g., language processing, visual analysis,
etc.) are subserved by separate modules. This position is en-
tirely consistent with the models that Farah presents: one model
concerns memory, which is generally not thought to be informa-
tionally encapsulated, and the others can reasonably be inter-
preted as partial specifications of modules for attention and face
recognition. Furthermore, the assumption of some kind of
global modularity seems to be a presupposition of the very
attempt to model a specific cognitive function. If the functioning
of the face-recognition system, say, is really intimately bound up
with the function of many or even most other cognitive pro-
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cesses then a free-standing face-recognition model is surely not
possible.
Third, the emphasis on the interactive nature of connectionist
models is idiosyncratic. Although McClelland (1991) empha-
sizes interaction in his GRAIN networks, most connectionist
models are feedforward networks (or variants) trained by back-
propagation. In experimental cognitive psychology many of the
same phenomena may be captured by both interactive and
feedforward network architectures (e.g., McClelland & Elman
1986; Norris 1990; Shillcock et al. 1992). Furthermore, connec-
tionist neuropsychological models, such as Patterson et al.'s
(1989) model of surface dyslexia and Hinton and Shallice's (1991)
model of deep dyslexia, derive interesting and detailed predic-
tions using feedforward networks. Since the analysis of the
general patterns of breakdown observed in even simple feedfor-
ward networks is extremely difficult (Bullinaria & Chater 1993),
it is surely much too early to decide between alternative net-
work architectures for neuropsychological modelling.
What is fundamental, and what rightly takes centre stage in
Farah's general discussion, is the difference between connec-
tionist neuropsychological models and the traditional box-
and-arrow approach. Traditional box-and-arrow models are so
underspecified that only very gross patterns of damage largely
concerning task dissociations can be predicted. [See Precis of
Shallice's From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure, BBS
14(3) 1991. ] By contrast, connectionist models are fully specified
mechanisms on which the behavioural effects of all manner of
damage can readily be tested, and which, when intact, can be
assessed as models of normal performance. This is perhaps the
real promise of Farah's work and that of the rest of the growing
field of connectionist neuropsychology.
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